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Quantum key distribution is a cryptographic primitive for the distribution of symmetric encryp-
tion keys between two parties that possess a pre-shared secret. Since the pre-shared secret is a
requirement, quantum key distribution may be viewed as a key growing protocol. We note that the
use of pre-shared secrets coupled with access to randomness beacons may enable key growing which,
though not secure from an information-theoretic standpoint, remains quantum safe.
Quantum key distribution [1, 2] (QKD) is a family of
optical techniques that enable two parties possessing a
pre-shared secret to grow a private symmetric key. The
only additional requirement to the pre-shared secret is
access to a high quality source of entropy via a quantum
channel. The entropy source is either controlled by one
party or, when entanglement is used, may be operated by
a third-party that is not necessarily trusted. The quan-
tum channel, typically an optical link, is not controlled.
The protocols for performing QKD are well-established
and numerous trials have been conducted to demonstrate
the practicability of the concept. Much effort has gone
into the development of QKD to extend the range of op-
tical links [3–6], to improve the protocols for growing the
secret key, and increasingly to identify and close side-
channels in actual implementations [7–9].
The main appeal for QKD is that it provides
information-theoretic security, or more simply ‘forward
security’. If a secret key is grown correctly using QKD
today, then it remains secure against any future improve-
ments in computational power. Once in possession of
this highly secure key, the users must make the decision
of how to use it. The common assumption is that QKD
users will deploy the key for information-theoretic en-
cryption such as in a Vernam cipher. However, this will
severely limit the quantity of data that can be encrypted,
and is likely to be used only for the most critical appli-
cations [10].
There is growing acceptance that the key grown using
QKD will be used in some type of fast symmetric encryp-
tion that provides a useful level of communications per-
formance while ensuring security against the emergence
of quantum computers. This is known as “quantum safe”
encryption. Such an encryption technique generally can-
not provide full forward security as it remains vulnerable
to unlimited computational power, but may be sufficient
for a wide range of communications data that need to be
kept private for a limited period of time.
In particular, a block-cipher scheme called the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been commonly
identified to be quantum safe as long as the length of the
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seed key is of sufficient length [11, 12]. Existing recom-
mendations are that the seed key be doubled from 128
bits to 256 bits [12] leaving aside the question of how the
keys are distributed and managed in the first place.
We note the possibility that methods like AES may be
used to grow encryption keys in a ‘quantum safe’ manner,
without the need for any quantum communication.
We consider the situation where Alice and Bob (our
two parties) have a pre-shared secret, as in QKD, but in-
stead of sharing an optical link, they now have access to a
randomness beacon that both of them agree to use. The
concept is illustrated in Figure 1. A randomness beacon
[13] is a broadcast service of high quality random num-
bers that are typically obtained from a quantum source.
Each new number that is broadcast is known as a pulse.
Randomness beacons can provide pulses via the Internet
or radio and may also provide an authenticated histori-
cal record of its performance to allow users to gauge the
quality of the randomness being provided.
Suppose that Alice and Bob treat their pre-shared se-
cret random numbers as a master key (M), which they
split into blocks of fixed size labelled M1, ..., Mn. They
label the pulses from the randomness beacon as P1, ...,
Pn. In a sense, Alice and Bob treat each pulse as an
encrypted random number, which only they can decrypt
uniquely given their pre-shared secret. These decrypted
pulses can be used by Alice and Bob as session keys for
normal communications. In other words, a session key Si
would be given by Si = F(Mi,Pi), where the operation
F can be any quantum safe cryptographic block cipher
or function. Such a method is similar to recommenda-
tions for key derivation using pseudorandom functions
[15] with the exception that in our example the function
should be quantum safe [16].
As an example consider the scenario when Alice and
Bob choose to use AES both for key growing and encrypt-
ing their regular communications. They need to keep in
mind that while the quantum safe AES master key Mi
has to be at least 256 bits long, the function F can only
process pulses Pi that are only 128 bits long (by defini-
tion). Hence Alice and Bob will need to concatenate the
output of a sequence of operations to obtain a session
key Si that is again quantum safe. Alternative options
for key growing would be to use functions derived from
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FIG. 1. Quantum safe symmetric key growing using (a) QKD or (b) a randomness beacon. In the QKD approach Alice
operates a random number generator (RNG) to encode a raw key (K) into a stream of quantum particles that is transmitted
to Bob’s detector (D). Bob measures the particles and communicates with Alice via a conventional channel authenticated with
their pre-shared secret (M) to derive a key with unconditional security (U). A cryptographic function (F’) may be used to
obtain an expanded session key (S’). In QKD, the pre-shared secret is used in an auxiliary protocol to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks, and its entropy is not inherited by U or S’. The RNG must be under the control of one party unless they are
performing entanglement-based QKD [14]. In the beacon approach, the RNG is operated at the beacon. Random numbers
in the form of pulses (P) are publicly broadcast. Alice and Bob use the pulses and their pre-shared secret (M) as inputs to a
cryptographic function (F) to generate the session key (S). No quantum channel is required in this case, and multi-party key
growing is possible. In both cases, a quantum safe key is obtained; in the QKD case the amount of unconditionally secure
entropy inherited by the derived key S’ is at best of the same length as U.
the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) [17], or related
functions.
In such a scheme, the security is entirely dependent on
the choice of function F and as in any conventional en-
cryption system, the decryption key Mi must be changed
periodically. This is not different from the case in QKD
where the pre-shared secret must also be replaced peri-
odically. Furthermore, if the output of QKD is used as
session keys in a block cipher such as AES those keys
must also be replaced periodically.
Another area where the decryption algorithm is im-
portant is in the possibility of collisions. There may
exist scenarios where an attacker has gained control of
the beacon and also knows when Alice and Bob wish to
update their session key. By transmitting a pulse with
a specific sequence, in the instance that Alice and Bob
are updating their session key, the attacker may be able
to get the decryption algorithm to produce a guessable
outcome. However, this can be overcome if the public
beacon maintains an authenticated database of all pulses
broadcast previously, allowing Alice and Bob to choose
randomly from the historical record. In this sense, the
‘freshness’ of the pulses is irrelevant. In any case the qual-
ity of the quantum random number generator in QKD
should also be subjected to scrutiny and investigated for
possible device interference.
The ability of symmetric key block ciphers to resist
quantum attacks is being investigated actively [18–20].
A recent paper estimated the resources needed to imple-
ment the Grover search algorithm to break AES blocks
[20] that use key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits respec-
tively. The paper provided estimates on qubit number
and gate interactions needed to break AES using Grover
once pre-identified ciphertext-plaintext pairs had been
provided. The need for pre-identified pairs is a challenge
for cryptanalysts [18, 20], but it should be noted that
a general weakness for encryption systems occur when
pairs of plaintext-ciphertext are made available (and is
generally called the ‘known plaintext attack’).
The use of a randomness beacon for quantum safe sym-
metric key growing has two major similarities to QKD
(see Table 1). These are the use of pre-shared secrets
between Alice and Bob, and a common source of random
numbers. The difference is that a quantum channel is
not required. Without the quantum channel one loses
the possibility to achieve information-theoretic security.
However, this key agreement method is extremely robust
against environmental effects since the users can obtain
the pulses via radio-frequency or internet services; high-
speed data encryption can be carried out without having
to rely on specialist technology; and key management
techniques may enable multiple parties to derive a com-
mon session key, overcoming an existing bottleneck in
QKD.
It is interesting to consider the use of pre-shared se-
crets with authenticated shared entropy sources such as
randomness beacons in the context of quantum safe key
growing and other related cryptographic applications.
Randomness beacons that act as shared entropy sources
may play a role analogous to that of the certificate au-
thority in present day public key encryption infrastruc-
ture, and it may be worthwhile to explore the use of these
beacons as part of a future quantum safe communications
system.
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3TABLE I. Beacon Key Distribution (BKD) vs. QKD.
BKD QKD
Multi-party Keys Y N
Quantum Channel Requirement N Y
Pre-shared Secret Y Y
Shared Entropy Source Y Y
Information-Theoretic Security N Y
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